Harris v. Quinn: US Supreme Court Rules on First Amendment Rights of Hybrid Public Sector and Private Sector Union Members

In Harris v. Quinn, ___ U.S. ___ (6/30/2014), the United States Supreme Court considered "whether the First Amendment permits a State to compel personal care providers to subsidize speech on matters of public concern by a union that they do not wish to join or support." The Court held that it does not, although the opinion's scope and future applicability seem to be limited by the fact that the union members at issue occupy a position somewhere between full-fledged public sector and private sector employees. 

The opinion is written by Justice Alito, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joining. Justice Kagan wrote a dissent, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. 

As usual, the decision's syllabus does an excellent job of tracing the ins and outs of the majority opinion: 

Illinois' Home Services Program (Rehabilitation Program) allows Medicaid recipients who would normally need institutional care to hire a "personal assistant" (PA) to provide homecare services. Under State law, the homecare recipients (designated "customers") and the State both play some role in the employment relationship with the PAs. Customers control most aspects of the employment relationship, including the hiring, firing, training, supervising, and disciplining of PAs; they also define the PA's duties by proposing a "Service Plan." Other than compensating PAs, the State's involvement in employment matters is minimal. Its employer status was created by executive order, and later codified by the legislature, solely to permit PAs to join a labor union and engage in collective bargaining under Illinois' Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA).  

Pursuant to this scheme, respondent SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana (SEIU-HII) was designated the exclusive union representative for Rehabilitation Program employees. The union entered into collective-bargaining agreements with the State that contained an agency-fee provision, which requires all bargaining unit members who do not wish to join the union to pay the union a fee for the cost of certain activities, including those tied to the collective-bargaining process. A group of Rehabilitation Program PAs brought a class action against SEIU-HII and other respondents in Federal District Court, claiming that the PLRA violated the First Amendment insofar as it authorized the agency-fee provision. The District Court dismissed their claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in relevant part, concluding that the PAs were state employees within the meaning of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 .  

Held: The First Amendment prohibits the collection of an agency fee from Rehabilitation Program PAs who do not want to join or support the union. Pp. 8-40.  

(a) In upholding the Illinois law's constitutionality, the Seventh Circuit relied on Abood, which, in turn, relied on Railway Employes v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 , and Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 . Unlike Abood, those cases involved private-sector collective-bargaining agreements. The Abood Court treated the First Amendment issue as largely settled by Hanson and Street and understood those cases to have upheld agency fees based on the desirability of "labor peace" and the problem of " 'free riders[hip].' " 431 U.S., 220-222 , 224 . However, "preventing nonmembers from free-riding on the union's efforts" is a rationale "generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections," Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U.S. ___ , ___ , and in this respect, Abood is "something of an anomaly," 567 U.S., at ___ .   

The Abood Court's analysis is questionable on several grounds. The First Amendment analysis in Hanson was thin, and Street was not a constitutional decision. And the Court fundamentally misunderstood Hanson's narrow holding, which upheld the authorization, not imposition, of an agency fee. The Abood Court also failed to appreciate the distinction between core union speech in the public sector and core union speech in the private sector, as well as the conceptual difficulty in public-sector cases of distinguishing union expenditures for collective bargaining from those designed for political purposes. Nor does the Abood Court seem to have anticipated the administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify union expenditures as either chargeable or nonchargeable, see, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507 , or the practical problems that would arise from the heavy burden facing objecting nonmembers wishing to challenge the union's actions. Finally, the Abood Court's critical "labor peace" analysis rests on the unsupported empirical assumption that exclusive representation in the public sector depends on the right to collect an agency fee from nonmembers. Pp. 8-20.  

(b) Because of Abood's questionable foundations, and because Illinois' PAs are quite different from full-fledged public employees, this Court refuses to extend Abood to the situation here. Pp. 20-29.  

(1) PAs are much different from public employees. Unlike full-fledged public employees, PAs are almost entirely answerable to the customers and not to the State, do not enjoy most of the rights and benefits that inure to state employees, and are not indemnified by the State for claims against them arising from actions taken during the course of their employment. Even the scope of collective bargaining on their behalf is sharply limited. Pp. 20-25.  

(2) Abood's rationale is based on the assumption that the union possesses the full scope of powers and duties generally available under American labor law. Even the best argument for Abood's anomalous approach is a poor fit here. What justifies the agency fee in the Abood context is the fact that the State compels the union to promote and protect the interests of nonmembers in "negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in settling disputes and processing grievances." Lehnert,supra, at 556. That rationale has little application here, where Illinois law requires that all PAs receive the same rate of pay and the union has no authority with respect to a PA's grievances against a customer. Pp. 25-27.  

(3) Extending Abood's boundaries to encompass partial public employees would invite problems. State regulations and benefits affecting such employees exist along a continuum, and it is unclear at what point, short of full-fledged public employment, Abood should apply. Under respondents' view, a host of workers who currently receive payments from a government entity for some sort of service would become candidates for inclusion within Abood's reach, and it would be hard to see where to draw the line. Pp. 27-29.  

(c) Because Abood does not control here, generally applicable First Amendment standards apply. Thus, the agency-fee provision here must serve a " 'compelling state interes[t] . . . that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.' " Knox, supra, at ___ . None of the interests that respondents contend are furthered by the agency-fee provision is sufficient. Pp. 29-34.  

(1) Their claim that the agency-fee provision promotes "labor peace" misses the point. Petitioners do not contend that they have a First Amendment right to form a rival union or that SEIU-HII has no authority to serve as the exclusive bargaining representative. This, along with examples from some federal agencies and many state laws, demonstrates that a union's status as exclusive bargaining agent and the right to collect an agency fee from nonmembers are not inextricably linked. Features of the Illinois scheme-e.g., PAs do not work together in a common state facility and the union's role is very restricted-further undermine the "labor peace" argument. Pp. 31-32.  

(2) Respondents also argue that the agency-fee provision promotes the welfare of PAs, thereby contributing to the Rehabilitation Program's success. Even assuming that SEIU-HII has been an effective advocate, the agency-fee provision cannot be sustained unless the union could not adequately advocate without the receipt of nonmember agency fees. No such showing has been made. Pp. 32-34.   

(d) Respondents' additional arguments for sustaining the Illinois scheme are unconvincing. First, they urge the application of a balancing test derived from Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563 . This Court has never viewed Abood and its progeny as based on Pickering balancing. And even assuming that Pickering applies, that case's balancing test clearly tips in favor of the objecting employees' First Amendment interests. Second, respondents err in contending that a refusal to extend Abood here will call into question this Court's decisions in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 , and Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 , for those decisions fit comfortably within the framework applied here. Pp. 34-40.

The full opinion is available here. SCOTUSblog has a number of interesting articles on the decision here. 

NLRB v. Noel Canning: United States Supreme Court Invalidates "Recess Appointments" to NLRB

On January 4, 2012, President Obama used recess appointments to name three members to the National Labor Relations Board. On January 25, 2013, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the President lacked constitutional authority to make these recess appointments. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, (D.C. Cir., 1/25/13) (discussed here). 

Last week, a unanimous Supreme Court of the United States agreed that the appointments at issue were invalid. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Court's introduction to the decision does a nice, concise job of describing the holdings. I have added a couple of comments and quotations from other parts of the opinion in brackets. I have also added the slip op. page numbers. 

Ordinarily the President must obtain “the Advice and Consent of the Senate” before appointing an “Office[r] of the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 2. But the Recess Appointments Clause creates an exception. It gives the President alone the power “to fill up all Vacan­cies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” Art. II, §2, cl. 3. We here consider three questions about the application of this Clause.   

The first concerns the scope of the words “recess of the Senate.” Does that phrase refer only to an inter-session recess (i.e., a break between formal sessions of Congress), or does it also include an intra-session recess, such as a summer recess in the midst of a session? We conclude that the Clause applies to both kinds of recess. [However, an intra-session recess must be of "substantial length" to allow for recess appointments, and "a recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is presumptively too short to fall within the Clause."] [Slip op. at 9-21.] 

The second question concerns the scope of the words “vacancies that may happen.” Does that phrase refer only to vacancies that first come into existence during a recess, or does it also include vacancies that arise prior to a recess but continue to exist during the recess? We conclude that the Clause applies to both kinds of vacancy.  [Slip op. at 21-33.] 

The third question concerns calculation of the length of a “recess.” The President made the appointments here at issue on January 4, 2012. At that time the Senate was in recess pursuant to a December 17, 2011, resolution providing for a series of brief recesses punctuated by “pro forma session[s],” with “no business . . . transacted,” every Tuesday and Friday through January 20, 2012. S. J., 112th Cong., 1st Sess., 923 (2011) (hereinafter 2011 S. J.). In calculating the length of a recess are we to ignore the pro forma sessions, thereby treating the series of brief recesses as a single, month-long recess? We conclude that we cannot ignore these pro forma sessions ["We hold that, for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business."] [Slip op. at 33-40.] 

Our answer to the third question means that, when the appointments before us took place, the Senate was in the midst of a 3-day recess. Three days is too short a time to bring a recess within the scope of the Clause. Thus we conclude that the President lacked the power to make the recess appointments here at issue.  [Slip op. at 40-42. ] 

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, reached the same result, but would have gone further, holding as follows: 

First, [the recess appointment power] may be exercised only in “the Recess of the Senate,” that is, the intermission between two formal legislative sessions. Second, it may be used to fill only those vacancies that “happen during the Recess,” that is, offices that become vacant during that intermission. 

The majority opinion is more narrow than it may have been. Rather than determining that all past recess appointments not meeting the opinion's standards are invalid, the Court held only that the three specific appointments at issue -- those appointments to the NLRB made by President Obama on January 4, 2012 -- are invalid.  

SCOTUSblog, which is an excellent resource, has a number of interesting pieces discussing the opinion here. 

The opinion itself is available here. 

County of LA v. LA County Employee Relations Commission: County Must Disclose Employee Contact Information to Union that Represents Them

The Supreme Court of California has issued its decision in County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (5/30/13) --- Cal.4th ---, which involves "the balance between an employee's right of informational privacy and a union's right to obtain information it needs to represent the employee in collective bargaining." The Court held as follows: 

The Service Employees International Union, Local 721 (SEIU) is the exclusive bargaining representative of all Los Angeles County (County) employees. The question here is whether SEIU is entitled to obtain the home addresses and phone numbers of all represented employees, including those who have not joined the union. We agree with both courts below that it is so entitled but reverse the Court of Appeal's imposition of procedural requirements limiting disclosure.  

State and federal labor decisions have long held that unions are presumptively entitled to contact information for all employees they represent. These decisions, and applicable labor laws, generally obligate the County to give SEIU the requested information. Whether the right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution prohibits disclosure is a question of first impression. We conclude that, although the County's employees have a cognizable privacy interest in their home addresses and telephone numbers, the balance of interests strongly favors disclosure of this information to the union that represents them. Procedures may be developed for employees who object to this disclosure. However, the Court of Appeal exceeded its authority in this administrative mandate proceeding by attempting to impose specific procedures on the parties. 

Slip op. at 1-2.  

The opinion is available here.